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Presentation format
• The approach followed for the 
privatisation
• Its eventual outcome
• The significance of industry structure
• The lessons learnt
The background
• Essentially a freight system with a small 
passenger operation (unlike Great Britain)
• Extensive market competition, including 
coastal shipping
• Also included a large truck operation
• Had needed two big refinancings in the  
dozen years before 1993
– Complete abandonment was even suggested
What happened – 1
• Privatised as one company, with no
regulator and no freight subsidy
– Urban passenger services were funded 
separately, via regional councils
• Significant investment from new owners
• This did grow the company’s traffic, if 
not its profitability
What happened – 2
• Apparent by 2000 that things weren’t 
working – so the then-owners sold out
• The company went into effective 
receivership in mid-2003
• Government refinanced the operation, 
by buying back the track for a nominal 
sum, and taking on much of the debt.
• The operational side was again onsold, 
to Australia’s Toll Holdings
What happened – 3
• But, the Government then wanted to 
make an ‘accounting profit’ on its rescue
• Result? Continuing arguments over 
track access charges
• Government eventually repurchased the 
operation (May 2008) – and Toll were 
more than ready to sell
What happened – 4
• Operation and track have been 
recombined
• There has been considerable catch-up 
investment
• But the branch network is under very
close scrutiny
• So we could still see significant network 
rationalisation in years to come
The common lessons with GB
• Ultimately, it was about saving money
– In New Zealand, keen desire to avoid 
further refinancing demands 
– In Great Britain, thought that subsidy would 
not be needed in future?
• But little or no acknowledgement in NZ 
of rail’s strategic importance & benefits
• And no-one had thought through the 
consequences of failure
The mixed bag of privatisation 
• Some examples where it has worked:
– Auckland and Wellington Airports, BAA plc
– British Telecom, New Zealand Telecom
– British ports companies
– A variety of transport services (eg. Intercity 
Coach, NZBus)
• So: why in these areas and not in rail?
Two issues to resolve:
• What is the industry’s structure, 
competitive or fixed-cost monopolistic? 
(most network industries are the latter)
• To what degree is the industry 
subsidised? 
– And thus, the major issue is any relation-
ship between fixed costs and subsidy 
needs
Market structure and subsidy
From competition to network monopoly
From 
subsidy 
to profit
Most bus travel in 
Britain; in NZ, inter-
island ferries; intercity 
coaches,  rail (then)
New Zealand 
urban buses; 
rail operating 
companies
Auckland, Welling-
ton airports; elec-
tricity transmission; 
Airways Corp
The GB rail network, 
New Zealand rail 
(now), airports in the 
smaller centres
Example: rail in Great Britain
Payment in
£m for 2008-
09 
(passenger 
rail only)
Fares Subsidy Total cost
Train 
company 
costs
6,004 590 6,594
Network Rail 
– paid 
directly
4,266 4,266
Total 6,004
55 
percent
4,856 10,860
Example: rail in Great Britain
Payment in
£m for 2008-
09
(passenger 
rail only)
Fares Subsidy Total cost Split out:
Network 
Rail, less 
freight
Other
Train 
company 
costs
6,004 590 6,594 1,533 5,061
Network Rail 
– paid 
directly
4,266 4,266 4,266
Total 6,004
55 
percent
4,856 10,860 5,799
53 
percent
5,061
The challenge of a subsidy-
dependent monopoly (1)
• The underlying issue is the combination 
of high fixed costs and high subsidy
• Private ownership is simply too risky:
– The high risks of monopoly organisation 
– The high risks of subsidy provision
– The high risks of regulation
• The lesson: assets like these have to 
remain in public ownership
The challenge of a subsidy-
dependent monopoly (2)
• Essentially, rail must be acknowledged 
as a ‘monopoly supplier’ of the external 
benefits we get from having freight (or 
people) on rail
• This was the situation in New Zealand, 
and why the Government of the time 
elected to secure those benefits through 
direct ownership
The separation of wheel and rail
Was this really the issue? Consider:
• Not separated in New Zealand, yet the 
privatisation still failed
• The separation in the USA seems to 
manage
• Europe seems to have made it work too
• Aviation is far more fragmented than 
rail, yet seems to manage as well
Closing thoughts (1)
• Money will always be the issue (there is 
never enough of it), because …
• Railways are still at the mercy of their 
own cost structure ….
• … because what people are prepared to 
pay for rail services, is much less than 
what it costs to provide those services
Closing thoughts (2)
The real issues are:
• How much railway do we want?
• How much are we prepared to pay for it? 
and …
• What is the real level of benefit that this 
money will purchase?
Because privatisation really isn’t the issue!
Thank You!
